achieve the target probability of default.
1 Applications of this approach include Risk Adjusted Return of Capital (RAROC) or Value at Risk (VaR).
In principle, allocated economic capital can be used to risk-adjust returns across various lines of business to reveal which activities create or destroy shareholder value. The most successful application, however, has been to the measurement and management of market risk.
In a sharp break with previous regulatory practice, t he Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision recognized this new approach to risk management in the 1996 Amendment on Market Risk to the original Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy. Rather than allocate positions to crude risk buckets or apply mechanical asset price haircuts to positions in order to measure risks, the Basel Committee provided the opportunity for qualifying banks to rely on the supervised use of their own internal models to determine their capital charges for exposure to market risk.
2 1 Note that regulators should be concerned not only with the probability of default, but also with the magnitude of loss in the event of a default if they are to serve as effective guardians of the deposit insurance fund and taxpayers. 2 It should be noted that the kind of capital implicit in the concept of economic capital is not identical to either Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital. Capital that would satisfy an economic capital requirement includes shareholder equity, retained earnings and reserves. This is broader than Tier 1, but less that the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2.
This internal models approach to regulation was expected to deliver several benefits. First, it would reduce or eliminate incentives for regulatory arbitrage since the capital charge would reflect the bank's own estimate of risk. Second, it would deal more flexibly with financial innovations, incorporating them in the regulatory framework as soon as they were incorporated in the bank's own risk management models. Third, it would provide banks with an incentive to improve their risk management processes and procedures in order to qualify for the internal models approach. And fourth, compliance cost would be reduced to the extent that the business was regulated in the same way that it was managed.
By and large, the internal models approach for market risk has proven to be highly successful, even when it was severely tested by the market disruptions in 1997 and 1998. (Nonetheless, some observers expressed concerns that increased risk sensitivity of capital charges for market risk may have contributed to the market dislocations by leading many firms to withdraw from markets at the same time in response to increased volatility, thus reducing liquidity.)
The success of the internal models approach to market risk led to the extension of the methodology to credit risk, the principal risk facing most banks. This is partly due to a blurring of the traditional line between trading and the lending business. Financial innovations have begun to erode traditional distinctions between the trading book and the banking book.
Increasingly, traders are dealing with less liquid, less creditworthy instruments. A market in credit risk -more precisely credit risk derivatives -is growing rapidly. And, bank loans are underwritten increasingly with a view toward making them more marketable. Indeed, there is a thriving secondary market in bank loans. Thus it was only natural that leading banks would attempt to apply the same financial technology that had proven so successful in measuring and managing market risk to credit risk.
At the same time, regulators were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the original Basel Accord. In response to growing evidence of regulatory capital arbitrage, regulators began to consider whether the paradigm used so successfully in the regulation of market risk could be applied to credit risk and operational risk. The result was a proposal for a new Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2).
The Basel Committee found that internal models of credit risk were not yet sufficiently reliable (or verifiable) to replicate the approach to market risk and so they embarked on a complex course of increasingly intrusive specifications about how banks should manage their credit risk by means of an internal ratings approach. This initiative has been criticized by the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2001), Altman and Saunders (2001) , and others 3 .
The proposal to extend capital regulation to operational risk has received less attention, but is even more vulnerable to criticism. In this instance, the Basel Committee is not simply changing regulation to conform to well-established industry best practice, as it did in market risk. It is attempting to define best practice.
Over the past year the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has refined its approach to setting minimum capital requirements for operational risk. 4 The result is a revised definition of operational risk, a reduced target for capital charges for operational risk relative to total minimum capital requirements and greater specificity about how such capital charges might be implemented.
5
I believe this attempt to set capital charges for operational risk is fundamentally misguided. The Basel Committee has identified three approaches to setting capital charges for operational risk: (1) The Basic Indicator Approach, (2) The Standardized Approach and (3) Income for this purpose as well (while recognizing that a trading unit that is making losses is not necessarily subject to lower operational risk). The quantitative impact study attempted to examine actual losses across these eight lines of business experienced by thirty banks in eleven countries from 1998 to 2000. These losses, however, do not necessarily reflect differences in risk. First, frequent small losses, because they are predictable, tend to be expensed. They do not contribute to the risk for which capital is held.
Second, the loss data did not reflect recoveries and indemnification from insurance.
The Advanced Measurement Approaches require multiple pages of preconditions that most institutions could not be expected to meet for years.
Reflecting the Basel Committee's uncertainty about the best way to proceed, it outlined three different approaches. The Basel Committee is willing to consider insurance as a mitigator of operational risk only under the Advanced Measurement Approaches.
Neither the Basic Indicator nor the Standardized Approach provides a persuasive way of relating the capital charge for operational risk to actual investment management companies.
differences in operational risk across institutions, and the Advanced Measurement Approaches remain to be fully specified. Clearly in this instance, the desire to make capital regulation risk sensitive has exceeded the Basel Committee's capacity to implement this worthy objective.
At a more fundamental level, it is unclear why the Basel Committee insists on dealing with operational risk under Pillar 1 -that is, as an issue of capital adequacy. Interest rate risk in the banking book, which is surely easier to quantify than operational risk, is dealt with only under Pillar 2 -that is, as a supervisory issue. Moreover, Pillar 2 is surely the most efficient way of dealing with operational risk. Appropriate policies, procedures and processes are the most direct way of dealing with internal events, and insurance is the most effective way of dealing with external events. These are the sorts of issues that are best dealt with in the supervisory process rather than through an extended but essentially arbitrary exercise in capital regulation.
The Basel Committee clearly intends to proceed along the supervisory line as well, but with a one-way ratchet. Supervisors will be able only to impose an additional capital charge if they find that policies, processes and procedures are inadequate, but not to reduce the capital charge for institutions that have exemplary controls. Since the Pillar 1 capital charge is already imperfectly risk sensitive, the Basel 2 approach that feeds operational risk into Pillar 1 may end up only distorting competition further.
More fundamentally, the proposal to establish a capital charge for operational risk raises the question of the circumstances under which regulators should attempt to hardwire the state of the art in management science in capital regulations. This was not a troubling issue with respect to market risk because there was a much broader consensus on the state of the art, and the state of the art was much more advanced. Moreover, the internal models approach to regulation was designed to change as internal models improve. But, in the case of operational risk --where there is much less consensus about state of the art, which is by any measure much more rudimentary and changing rapidly --regulators run the risk of crystallizing the state of the art prematurely. Because international negotiations are long, cumbersome and highly political, they take a very long time to complete.
What may have been state of the art when negotiations began may no longer be state of the art when negotiations conclude. And if the history of the original Accord is any guide, it may take at least a decade to revise even regulations that are widely viewed as dysfunctional.
